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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Laws are like cobwebs that entangle the weak, but are broken by the
strong.”
1
Anarcharsis, Ancient Greek Philosopher
On April 23, 1987, the New Jersey Legislature unanimously
2
adopted the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act (“CDRA”) of 1987.
3
The statute, enacted in response to the state’s increasing drug
4
problems, wages war against drugs in New Jersey on a number of
5
fronts. The CDRA ensures stringent, consistent punishment for all
6
7
drug offenders, both users and dealers; it provides incentive and
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1
Quotes on Good and Evil and Power and Truth, at http://www.math.usf.edumccol/Equotes.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).
2
W. Cary Edwards, An Overview of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987, 13
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 5, 6 (1989).
3
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004).
4
Edwards, supra note 2, at 8. In 1986, there was a record 40,690 drug arrests in
New Jersey, making approximately 50% of all crime in New Jersey drug related. See
also DEA Briefs and Background, Drugs and Drug Abuse, State Fact Sheets, New
Jersey (Mar. 25, 2002) (noting that New Jersey is an attractive transportation site for
drug gangs based on its international airport, proximity to New York City, and its
numerous major commercial shipping centers and further noting that in urban
areas, such as Elizabeth, Newark, Trenton and Camden, there continues to be
widespread
crack,
heroin
and
cocaine
abuse),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/states/newjersey.html; see also N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:35-1.1(b) (West 2004) (noting in its legislative findings that, “the unlawful use,
manufacture, and distribution of controlled dangerous substances continues to pose
a serious and pervasive threat to the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of this
state”).
5
Edwards, supra note 2, at 6.
6
Id.
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encouragement for the state’s youth to avoid the dangers of drugs; it
attempts to reduce the drug supply in the state of New Jersey by
providing police, prosecutors, and courts with the tools necessary to
10
wage a successful attack against drug traffickers and dealers; and
finally, through education, the CDRA attempts to reduce the demand
11
for drugs in the state.
New Jersey’s strict liability for drug-induced death statute, 2C:3512
13
9, was enacted as part of the CDRA in 1987. Under this statute, a
7

Id. (noting that in some circumstances the CDRA requires mandatory
suspension or postponement of driving privileges upon conviction of a drug related
offense and stating that the statute mandates the imposition of cash penalties for all
drug convictions).
8
Id. (quoting former New Jersey Attorney General W. Cary Edwards, “it [CDRA]
creates drug ‘safety zones’ around school yards in recognition of the paramount
responsibility of the school to educate our youth . . . [and] mandates the imposition
of stiff cash penalties for all drug convictions, and the use of these funds to increase
educational preventive and treatment programs throughout the state”).
9
National Drug Intelligence Center, New Jersey Drug Threat Assessment (May 15,
2001) (noting that in 1999 there were 144 cocaine overdoses that resulted in death
in Newark. Of 23 U.S. cities surveyed in 1999, Newark had the highest mean heroin
purity
levels,
67.5%),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/669/cocaine.html; see also NBC News.com, Gangs
Take Root in the Garden State, (Nov. 7, 2002) (reporting that the increase of violent
crimes in New Jersey is directly correlated with the “super-gangs” that have followed
the drug trade east and further noting that a survey of New Jersey police departments
has linked one in five murders to drug related gang activity),
available at http://www.wnbc.com/news/1771216/detail.html.
10
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004):
[I]n order to be effective, the battle against drugs must be waged
aggressively at every level along the drug distribution chain, but in
particular, our criminal laws must target for expedited prosecution and
enhanced punishment those repeat drug offenders and upper echelon
members of the organized narcotics trafficking networks who pose the
greatest danger to society.
11
Edwards, supra note 2, at 7.
12
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2004). The statute provides in pertinent part:
a. Any person who manufactures, distributes, or dispenses any
controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedules I or II
(including heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, lysergic acid
diethylamide, phencyclidine, or any analog thereof) is strictly liable for
a death which results from the ingestion, injection, or inhalation of
that substance and is guilty of a crime of the first degree.
b. For purposes of this offense, to distribute means the transfer, actual
or constructive, or attempted, from one person to another. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:35-2 (West 2004).
c. For purposes of this offense manufacture means the production,
preparation, propagation compounding, conversion or processing of
[insert appropriate substance] either directly or by extraction from
substances of natural origin. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-2 (West 2004).
d. The defendants act of manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing, a
substance is the cause of death when:
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person may be held strictly liable for drug-induced death, a first
14
degree crime punishable by ten to twenty years in prison, if she
manufactured, sold, or otherwise provided a person with drugs, if
that person subsequently dies as a result of ingestion, inhalation, or
15
injection of those drugs. The New Jersey legislature included this
powerful strict liability provision as a way to trace liability back to the
“upper echelon” drug dealers or “kingpins” of the organized drug
16
trade. The statute explicitly states,
(1)

The injection, inhalation or ingestion of the substance is an
antecedent but for which the death would not have occurred;
and
(2) The death was not:
(a) too remote in its occurrence as to have a just bearing on
the defendant’s liability; or
(b) too dependent upon conduct of another person which
was unrelated to the injection, inhalation or ingestion of
the substance or its effect as to have a just bearing on the
defendant’s liability.
e. It shall not be a defense to a prosecution under this section that the
decedent contributed to his own death by his purposeful, knowing,
reckless or negligent injection, inhalation or ingestion of the
substance, or by his consenting to the administration of the substance
by another.
13
Id.
14
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(1) (West 2004). In State v. Cullum, 338 N.J.
Super. 458, 769 A.2d 1091 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), the court found that druginduced death was a “violent crime” under the provisions of the No Early Release Act
(NERA), which requires individuals convicted of a violent crime to serve eighty-five
percent of their sentence before being eligible for parole. Id. at 464, 769 A.2d at
1095. The court defined violent crime under NERA to include any crime that causes
death. Id. In this case, the defendant provided heroin to a person who overdosed
and died a few minutes after injection. Id. at 460, 769 A.2d at 1092. The court found
that the defendant caused the death of the decedent when he distributed the heroin
to him and therefore was subject to the provisions of NERA. Id. at 464, 769 A.2d at
1095 (emphasis added). Furthermore, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-14 (West 2004)
makes a person convicted of drug-induced death ineligible for drug dependant
persons treatment. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 35-15(a)(1) (West 2004) imposes a
mandatory penalty of three thousand dollars. Finally, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 35-16
(West 2004) imposes a mandatory suspension of driving privileges for a period of no
less than 6 months.
15
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9.
16
Upon enactment of the drug-induced death statute, the New Jersey legislature
declared it the public policy of the state that
“[I]n particular our criminal laws must target for expedited
prosecution and enhanced punishment those repeat drug offenders
and upper echelon members of organized narcotics trafficking networks
who pose the greatest danger to society. In order to ensure the most
efficient and effective dedication of limited investigative, prosecutorial,
judicial and correctional resources, it is the policy of this State to
distinguish between drug offenders based on the seriousness of the
offense, considering principally the nature, quality and purity of the
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[the statute] must target for expedited prosecution and enhanced
punishment those repeat drug offenders and upper echelon
members of organized narcotics trafficking networks who pose
the greatest danger to society. In order to ensure the most
efficient and effective dedication of limited investigative,
prosecutorial, judicial and correctional resources, it is the policy
of this State to distinguish between drug offenders based on the
seriousness of the offense, considering principally the nature,
quality and purity of the controlled substance and the role of the
actor in the overall drug distribution network. It is the intention
of the legislature to provide for the strict punishment, deterrence
and incapacitation of the most culpable and dangerous drug
offenders, and to facilitate the rehabilitation of drug dependent
17
persons.

As the aforementioned statutory language should make clear,
the legislature envisioned the statute as a way to cripple the organized
drug trade by giving prosecutors the power to attack upper echelon
drug dealers, who oftentimes have no interaction with their buyers
18
and are therefore virtually immune to homicide prosecution. Based
19
on the strict liability provision of the New Jersey statute, the
20
prosecutor can gain a conviction without ever proving the mens rea,
21
or requisite mental state, normally required for conviction. The
controlled substance and the role of the actor in the overall drug
distribution network. It is the intention of the legislature to provide for the
strict punishment, deterrence and incapacitation of the most culpable and
dangerous drug offenders, and to facilitate the rehabilitation of drug dependent
persons.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004) (emphasis added).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
The strict liability feature of the New Jersey statute allows the prosecutor to
carry the burden of persuasion and gain a conviction without proving mens rea.
Strict liability does not depend on intent to harm or negligence, rather it is premised
on the breach of an absolute duty to engage in safe activity or to make an activity
safe. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 926 (7th ed. 1999).
20
Mens rea is the state of mind that the prosecutor must prove in order to carry
his burden of persuasion at trial. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 999 (7th ed. 1999).
21
The normal rules for causation do not apply to this offense. Gerald D. Miller,
Controlled Dangerous Substance Offenses in the Code and Schedules of Controlled Dangerous
Substances, in 33A NJPRAC § 25.20 (3d ed. 2001). With regard to most other criminal
offenses, including prosecutions for sexual assault, robbery, burglary, and most types
of murder, the New Jersey Criminal Code rules require that the prosecutor prove the
defendant’s mental culpability in order to secure a conviction. Essentially, the
prosecutor must establish that the defendant acted with the requisite mental state in
order to meet his burden of persuasion. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-2 (West 2004);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:15-1 (West 2004);
Miller, supra, at § 25.20 (noting that strict liability crimes are a deviation from normal
New Jersey Criminal Code crimes). In a typical manslaughter prosecution, the mens
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prosecutor must only prove that the defendant dispensed drugs to
the decedent, or to a third party who dispensed drugs to the
decedent, and that the decedent died as a result of ingesting the
22
drugs. The statute would enable prosecutors to convict “kingpins”
by proving only that they sold drugs to a smaller dealer, who in turn
23
sold drugs to a user who overdosed and died.
Theoretically,
prosecutors could use this statute to secure a number of convictions
24
every time a user dies from a drug overdose.
Despite the aforementioned legislative declarations regarding
25
the intended use of 2C:35-9, prosecutor’s application of the statute,
26
more often than not, is in direct contravention of such intent. In
fact, the statute is rarely used to attack “upper echelon drug
27
dealers,” who, according to the legislature, are the parties that
28
should be targeted by this powerful statute. To the contrary, in the
rea would be recklessness, and therefore require that the prosecutor prove that the
defendant was aware of a substantial risk but proceed anyway. N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:11-4 (West 2004). In the context of a drug sale, this requirement would only be
met if the drug dealer had facts within his knowledge that would create a substantial
risk that the buyer would die as a result of ingestion. Id. For example, if the seller
normally sold the buyer fifty percent heroin but on this occasion was selling him one
hundred percent pure heroin, knowing that there was a good chance that the buyer
would inject the same amount as he normally does, then the prosecutor could likely
gain a conviction under a reckless manslaughter statute if the buyer was to overdose
and die as a result of ingestion. Id. The New Jersey drug-induced death statute
removes this requirement and allows the prosecutor to get a conviction just by
proving that the defendant provided the drugs to the decedent and that the
decedent died as a result of ingestion of the drugs, the state does not have to prove
the defendant’s mental culpability as to causing death. Miller, supra, at § 25.20.
22
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2004).
23
Id.
24
Jim Edwards, Making Friends Into Felons, N.J. LAW J., Sept. 9, 2002, at 1 (citing
statements made by Ronald Susswein, counsel to the director of the Director of
Criminal Justice, who stated, “it says right in the legislative history, [§ 2C:35-9] can be
traced back to some kingpin operating in another country”).
25
See supra note 16 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the
legislative intent of the drug-induced death statute.
26
See State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 645 A.2d 1165 (1994); State v. Ervin, 242
N.J. Super. 584, 577 A.2d 1273 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); State v. Cullum, 338
N.J. Super. 458, 769 A.2d. 1091 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); State ex rel. A.J., 232
N.J. Super. 274, 556 A.2d 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1989).
27
In 25 out of 32 cases identified by a poll of county prosecutors, the defendants
charged did not deal drugs “in any serious manner.” Edwards, supra note 24, at 1.
28
Upon enactment of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act, the legislature
stated,
“[I]n order to ensure the most efficient and effective dedication of
limited investigative, prosecutorial, judicial and correctional resources,
it is the policy of this State to distinguish between drug offenders based
on the seriousness of the offense, considering principally the nature,
quality and purity of the controlled substance and the role of the actor
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majority of cases the statute has been used to prosecute minors with
29
no record or evidence of prior drug dealing, family members who
30
engaged in drug use “recreationally,” and “small time users,” whom
the legislature expressly stated should be rehabilitated, not
31
incapacitated.
Although the statute’s purpose was to punish dealers as killers,
32
without regard to their intent, a closer look at application indicates
that very few dealers have been prosecuted and/or convicted under
33
the statute.
According to one state prosecutor, “the accused is
34
oftentimes the last person who wanted the decedent to die.” Out of
thirty-two drug-induced death prosecutions identified and examined
35
by the New Jersey Law Journal, twenty-five involved prosecutions of
friends of the decedent who did not deal drugs in any significant
36
manner, and only three involved prosecutions of actual drug
37
dealers. These statistics indicate that almost ninety-percent of druginduced death prosecutions in New Jersey are in direct contravention
38
of legislative intent.
This Comment will explore the various consequences of the New
Jersey drug- induced death statute. Part II of this Comment will
examine the case law surrounding the statute and demonstrate that,
more often than not, application of the statute is outside the realm of
what the legislature intended. Furthermore, this section will argue
in the overall drug distribution network. It is the intention of the
legislature to provide for the strict punishment, deterrence and incapacitation of
the most culpable and dangerous drug offenders, and to facilitate the
rehabilitation of drug dependent persons.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004) (emphasis added).
29
See State ex rel. A.J., 232 N.J. Super. at 274, 556 A.2d at 1283.
30
See Ervin, 242 N.J. Super. at 584, 577 A.2d at 1273; Cullum, 338 N.J. Super. at
458, 769 A.2d. at 1091.
31
The legislative declaration states, “[i]t is the intention of the legislature to
provide for the strict punishment, deterrence and incapacitation of the most
culpable and dangerous drug offenders, and to facilitate the rehabilitation of drug
dependent persons.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004) (emphasis added). See
Maldonado, 137 N.J. at 536, 645 A.2d at 1165; Ervin, 242 N.J. Super. at 584, 577 A.2d
at 1273.
32
See supra note 16 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the
legislative intent.
33
Edwards, supra note 24, at 1.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. In the other four cases the relationship of the defendant to the decedent
was unknown. Id.
38
Edwards, supra note 24, at 1. It is not known what proportion the thirty-two
cases examined represent of the total number of indictments.
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that the justifications set forth for this powerful statute by both courts
and the legislature are misplaced, as the statute accomplishes none of
its asserted objectives. Part III suggests alternatives to the current
New Jersey drug-induced death statute and argues that these
alternatives reduce the various problems associated with the current
statute. Finally, Part IV will conclude that 2C:35-9 has accomplished
none of its objectives, demonstrate that the unintended
consequences of the statute significantly outweigh any benefits
provided by the statute, and argue that the most effective solution to
the problems created by the statute would be for the legislature to
expressly limit its application to “upper echelon” drug dealers and
kingpins.
II. APPLICATION AND CURRENT STATUS OF LIABILITY FOR
DRUG-INDUCED DEATH IN NEW JERSEY.
As noted above, in order to carry the burden of persuasion at
trial and secure a conviction for drug-induced death under 2C:35-9,
the prosecutor must only prove that the defendant dispensed drugs
to the decedent, or to a third party who dispensed drugs to the
decedent, and that the decedent died as a result of ingesting the
39
drugs. The prosecutor does not have to prove any mental state on
the part of the defendant, as liability for drug-induced death is strict,
and therefore he can carry his burden by proving only that the guilty
40
act took place. 2C:35-9 states, in pertinent part:
a. Any person who manufactures, distributes, or dispenses any
controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedules I or II
(including heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, lysergic acid
diethylamide, phencyclidine, or any analog thereof) is strictly
liable for a death which results from the ingestion, injection, or
inhalation of that substance and is guilty of a crime of the first
degree.
b. For purposes of this offense, to distribute means the transfer,
actual or constructive, or attempted, from one person to
41
another.

The legislative declarations regarding 2C:35-9 indicate that the
legislature included this powerful strict liability provision as a way to
trace liability back to the “upper echelon” drug dealers or “kingpins”
42
of the organized drug trade. Upon enactment of the statute, the
39
40
41
42

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2004).
See supra note 19 for a discussion of the implications of a strict liability statute.
Id.
Id.
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New Jersey legislature stated, “it is the intention of the legislature to
provide for the strict punishment, deterrence and incapacitation of
the most culpable and dangerous drug offenders, and to facilitate the
43
rehabilitation of drug dependent persons.”
44
In State v. Maldonado, the New Jersey Supreme Court examined
45
the constitutionality of 2C:35-9 for the first time. On May 7, 1988
Lucy Maldonado bought heroin from a local dealer for her friend
46
Larry and his brother John. After obtaining the drugs from a local
dealer, Ms. Maldonado gave the drugs to Larry and John, receiving
47
no profit for herself in the transaction. Subsequently, Larry and
48
John went to another location where they injected the heroin. The
next morning John found Larry lying dead on the floor, the result of
49
a heroin overdose. Ms. Maldonado was charged and convicted of
50
drug-induced death and sentenced to fifteen years in prison.
In upholding the conviction, the New Jersey Supreme Court
deferred to the judgment of the legislature and found the strict
liability portion of the statute valid, under both state and federal
51
constitutions. The court justified the strict liability provision of the
statute, stating,
[a]bsolute liability for regulatory offenses traditionally finds
justification in administrative convenience, the need to deter
through the most effective forms of prosecution, dispensing with
52
proof of intent, and imposing relatively minor punishment, all
adding up to a conclusion that whatever injustice results from
strict liability is more than counterbalanced by the benefit to the

43

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004).
State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 645 A.2d 1165 (1994).
45
Id. at 545, 645 A.2d at 1169.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Maldonado, 137 N.J. at 545, 645 A.2d at 1169
51
Id. at 584, 645 A.2d at 1188-89. Upon rejecting the defendant’s cruel and
unusual punishment attack, the court set forth a three-part inquiry to be used, under
both state and federal constitutions, in order to determine if punishment is cruel
and unusual:
1) Does the punishment for the crime conform with contemporary
standards of decency?
2) Is the punishment grossly disproportionate to the offense?
3) Does the punishment go beyond what is necessary to accomplish any
penological objective?
Id. at 556- 57, 645 A.2d at 1175.
52
Ms. Maldonado was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Id. at 545, 645 A.2d at
1169.
44
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53

public.

Subsequently, the court affirmed the conviction and fifteen-year
54
prison sentence.
Perhaps the most controversial prosecution under 2C:35-9
55
occurred in the case of State in the Interest of AJ. A.J., and his two
friends, including the decedent, a sixteen year old female, decided
56
that they would have a party one evening. At the request of the
decedent, A.J. and the decedent took a train to New York City where
57
58
A.J. purchased “angel dust” for use that evening. Upon returning
to Morristown, the juveniles headed to an unused train car where
59
they would “smoke the dust.” The juveniles smoked two marijuana
60
cigarettes, “rolled” by A.J., which were laced with “dust.”
After
61
smoking the second cigarette, the group decided to return to their
62
respective homes in Morristown. It was at this time that A.J. and
another juvenile noticed that the decedent was lying passed out on
63
the tracks.
A.J. and the other juvenile attempted to move the
64
decedent but she “felt like a dead weight in their arms.”
A.J.
attempted to move the decedent by himself, but was unable to, as he
65
was “fairly messed up from smoking the dust.” A.J. and the other
juvenile decided to leave the decedent on the train tracks, and they
66
returned to their respective homes. At approximately 12:30 a.m., a

53

Id. at 550, 645 A.2d at 1171-72.
Id. at 584, 645 A.2d at 1189.
55
State ex rel. A.J., 232 N.J. Super. 274, 556 A.2d 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1989).
56
Id. at 276, 556 A.2d at 1284.
57
“Angel dust” or “PCP” are the slang terms for phencyclidine, a schedule II
controlled dangerous substance. Id. at 281, 556 A.2d at 1286. Phencyclidine is a
hallucinogen, which can be snorted, smoked, or injected. National Institute on Drug
Abuse, Info Facts, at www.nida.nih.gov/Infofax/pcp.html (last Visited March 25
2002). The drug gives users feelings of strength, power, and invulnerability. Id. At
low to moderate doses, physiological effects include “an increased pulse rate,
breathing rate, and blood pressure.” Id. At high doses, “physiological effects include
a drop in blood pressure, breathing rate and pulse rate, nausea, vomiting, blurred
vision, dizziness, seizures, comas, and death.” Id.
58
State ex rel. A.J.,232 N.J. Super. at 277, 556 A.2d at 1285.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 278, 556 A.2d at 1285.
61
The facts do not indicate the quantity of drugs consumed by each juvenile. Id.
at 278-80, 556 A.2d at 1284-86.
62
Id. at 278, 556 A.2d at 1285.
63
Id.
64
State ex rel. AJ, 232 N.J. Super. at 278, 556 A.2d at 1285.
65
Id.
66
Id.
54

1336

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:1327
67

New Jersey Transit train struck and killed the decedent. A.J. was
subsequently convicted under 2C:35-9 for causing the drug-induced
68
death of the decedent.
The appellate court sustained the superior court’s decision and
found that A.J. knowingly or purposely distributed phencyclidine to
the decedent, the decedent died, and distribution to the decedent
69
70
was the cause of the death. The appellate court also agreed with
the trial court’s determination that A.J. could not be rehabilitated by
71
72
age nineteen and therefore sustained the waiver into adult court.
As with the Maldonado case discussed earlier, State in the Interest of
A.J. is illustrative of the plethora of problems that the drug-induced
73
death statute creates. In both cases, the strict liability feature of the
New Jersey statute allowed the prosecutor to gain convictions against
parties who would have faced little or no punishment in the absence
74
of strict liability.
Moreover, as stated earlier, the legislature has
justified the strict liability statute in terms of its application to drug
75
lords and kingpins. However, in both of the aforementioned cases,
76
and in the majority of cases, the statute has been used to prosecute
67

Id. at 279, 556 A.2d at 1285.
Id. at 281, 556 A.2d at 1286-87.
69
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9(b) (West 2004) states that the act of distribution
was the cause of the death if, “the injection, inhalation, or ingestion of the drug was
an antecedent but for which the death would not have occurred, and the death was
not too remote to have just a bearing on the defendant’s liability or too
dependant upon the conduct of another person that was unrelated to the use of
effects of the drug.”
70
State ex rel A.J., 232 N.J. Super. at 290, 556 A.2d at 1292. The court approved
the trial court’s conclusion that there was probable cause to believe that the juvenile
(A.J.) knowingly or purposely distributed phencyclidine to S.G. (the decedent) in
violation of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-5 (West 2004), and that the juvenile’s
distribution of the drugs to S.G. was the cause of her death within the meaning of
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9(b). Id. at 290, 556 A.2d at 1292.
71
Once the state establishes the factual predicate for the waiver, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:4A-26 (West 2004) requires the juvenile, in order to overcome the waiver, to
establish:, “the probability of his being rehabilitated prior to attaining the age of 19
and that this probability substantially outweighs the reasons for the waiver.” Id.
72
State ex rel A.J., 232 N.J. Super. at 292, 556 A.2d at 1287.
73
In State ex rel A.J., the drug-induced death statute was used to prosecute a
juvenile for drug-induced death despite the fact that there was no indication that the
juvenile was a drug dealer or delinquent in any manner. See State ex rel A.J., 232 N.J.
Super. at 292, 556 A.2d at 1283. The defendant in A.J. was clearly not a “kingpin” of
the organized drug trade and therefore his conviction creates precedent that allows
drug-induced prosecutions which are clearly outside the realm that the New Jersey
Legislature envisioned upon enactment of the statute. See supra note 16 for a
detailed discussion of the legislative history of the statute.
74
See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
75
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
76
See Edwards, supra note 24, at 1 (noting that the majority of prosecutions
68
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parties with no record of prior drug dealing.
Out of thirty-two drug-induced death prosecutions examined in
a recent study by the New Jersey Law Journal, only three were against
78
actual drug dealers. The other twenty-nine were against friends of
the deceased, family members, and in some cases the people who
79
sought emergency care for the decedent.
As noted earlier, the
legislature did not intend for prosecutors to use this powerful tool
against drug dependent persons or even small time dealers, as was
80
done in both Maldonado and State in the Interest of A.J. The legislature
envisioned this statute as a way to trace liability back to the “upper
echelon” dealers, whom, in the absence of this statute, were virtually
81
untouchable. Despite this, a sixteen-year-old, drug addicted child,
with no record of substantial drug dealing, was convicted under a
statute designed to attack “drug kingpins” and will spend the next few
82
decades of his life in jail - all this in a state where “it is the intention
of the legislature to provide for the strict punishment, deterrence,
and incapacitation of the most culpable and dangerous drug
83
offenders, and to facilitate the rehabilitation of drug dependant persons.”
The courts in both Maldonado and State in the Interest of A.J.
attempted to justify their respective decisions by asserting that the
84
85
deterrent effect of the statute on drug dealers and organizations
under § 2C:35-9 are against parties who have never dealt drugs).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 14.
80
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004) states that § 2C:35-9 should only be
used to prosecute upper echelon drug dealers, drug dependant persons should be
rehabilitated, not incapacitated. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004); see also
supra note 16. In both State ex rel A.J. and Maldonado, the defendants were convicted
under this statute notwithstanding the lack of direct evidence that they dealt drugs in
any serious manner; they were obviously not drug kingpins or upper echelon
members of the organized drug trade. See State ex rel A.J., 232 N.J. Super. 274, 556
A.2d 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1989); see also State v. Maldonado 137 N.J. 536,
645 A.2d 1165 (1994).
81
However, in State v. Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. 377, 288 A.2d 32 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
App. Div. 1972), the court found it possible to gain a conviction under reckless
manslaughter for distribution of heroin to a party who subsequently dies as a result
of injection. Id. at 379-80, 288 A.2d at 33-34.
82
State ex rel A.J., 232 N.J. Super. at 274, 556 A.2d at 1283.
83
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1.
84
For a detailed look at the deterrence theory, see generally, George A. Antunes
& A. Lee Hunt, The Deterrent Impact of Criminal Sanctions: Some Implications for Criminal
Justice Policy, 51 J. URB. L. 145 (1973).
85
In Maldonado, the court stated, “absolute liability for regulatory offenses
traditionally finds justification in administrative convenience, the need to deter
through the most effective forms of prosecution, dispensing with proof of intent, and
imposing relatively minor punishment.” Maldonado, 137 N.J. at 550, 645 A.2d at
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outweighs any potential unfairness to defendants. The courts and
the legislature contend that knowledge of the powerful statute and its
harsh penalties will deter individuals from engaging in drug use and
87
drug sales. Although this justification seems logical, in actuality the
statute seems to have little, if any, deterrent effect on drug users or
88
dealers. This lack of deterrence can be attributed, in large part, to
sparse usage of the statute. Since 1987, the statute has been used
only five times in Essex county, the state’s most urban county, five
times in Middlesex county, five times in Hunderton county, and only
89
Due to the
once in Atlantic, Hudson, and Passaic counties.
90
extremely low number of prosecutions sought under 2C:35-9, it is
reasonable to assume that drug dealers do not even know 2C:35-9
exists. If drug dealers are unaware of the existence of the statute,
91
then the statute can have no deterrent effect on their conduct.
Deterrence theory is predicated on the notion that criminals weigh
92
their potential gains and losses before they act. In this case, if drug
dealers are unaware of the consequences of their actions, specifically
the potential for prosecution under 2C:35-9, then that will not factor
93
into their decision making process and there will be no deterrence.
Furthermore, even if some drug dealers know of the statute’s
94
existence, the chances that it will be used against them are so
1171-72.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
“There is nothing from which to infer that this particular drug statute [§ 2C:359], in all its severity, will deter drug dealers from engaging in their unlawful
behavior.” Blair Talty, New Jersey’s Strict Liability for Drug-induced Deaths: The Leap From
Drug Dealer to Murderer, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 513, 516 n.14 (1999).
89
Id. Furthermore, it is important to note that the low number of prosecutions
sought under the statute is not attributable of an overall drop in the number of drug
overdose deaths in New Jersey. Drug Intelligence Center, New Jersey Drug Threat
Assessment (May 15 2001) (noting that in 1999 there were over 144 cocaine overdoses
that
resulted
in
death
in
Newark
alone),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/669/cocaine.html.
90
Edwards, supra note 24, at 14.
91
John K Cochran, et al., Deterrence or Brutalization? An impact assessment of
Oklahoma’s Return to Capital Punishment (March 25, 2002) (noting that the deterrence
theory is predicated on the notion that criminals weigh their gains and losses before
they act), available at http://www.justiceblind.com. In this case, if drug dealers are
unaware of the consequences of their actions, specifically the potential for
prosecution under § 2C:35-9, then that will not factor into their decision making
process and there will be no deterrence. See id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Even in those situations where the dealer is aware of the drug-induced death
statute there may be no deterrence. See Edwards, supra note 24, at 14. For example,
in January 2001, Leonardo DiPasquale, a seventeen year-old from Hunderton
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miniscule that any deterrent effect the statute may have is weak at
95
best. Finally, it is hard to imagine that a person can be deterred
from committing a crime that requires no mens rea for commission.
Legislatures would be more successful, in achieving general
deterrence, if the punishment was directly related to the sale of the
96
drugs, which requires a mens rea element for conviction.
Therefore, the contention of courts and the legislature that the
benefit of the statute to the public, through deterrence, outweighs
97
any unfairness to defendants, is misplaced and inaccurate.
New Jersey courts have also attempted to justify the strict liability
98
statute by noting that it imposes “relatively minor punishment.” The
New Jersey Supreme Court in Maldonado stated, “absolute liability for
regulatory offenses traditionally finds justification in administrative
convenience, the need to deter through the most effective forms of
prosecution, dispensing with proof of intent, and imposing relatively
99
This asserted justification is obviously flawed.
minor punishment.”
100
Fifteen years imprisonment is clearly not “minor punishment.”
101
Furthermore, in State v. Cullum, drug-induced death was found to
102
constitute a violent crime as defined by the No Early Release Act,
and, therefore, a person convicted must serve eighty-five percent of
103
their sentence before being eligible for parole.
County, was involved in a drug transaction which resulted in the overdose death of
one of DiPasquale’s friends. Id. Despite facing strict liability prosecution under §
2C:35-9 for the death of the teen, DiPasquale continued selling and using drugs. Id.
A few months later, while still facing the grand jury indictment, DiPasquale died
from a heroin overdose. Id.
95
Because the chance of prosecution for drug-induced death is so miniscule,
based on the extremely low number of convictions sought under the statute, a drug
dealer will not seriously consider conviction under the statute as a possibility when
weighing his potential gains and losses from the conduct. Therefore, there will be
no deterrence. See Cochran, et al., supra note 91, at 177; see also Talty, supra note 88,
at 529.
96
Talty, supra note 88, at 529 n.75.
97
See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text. Legislatures would be more
successful in achieving general deterrence if the punishment was directly related to
the sale of the drugs, which requires a mens rea element for conviction. Talty, supra
note 88, at 529 n.75.
98
State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 645 A.2d 1165 (1994).
99
Id.
100
Ms. Maldonado was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Id. at 545, 645 A.2d at
1119.
101
State v. Cullum, 338 N.J. Super. 458, 769 A.2d 1091 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001).
102
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.2 (West 2004).
103
NERA provides in pertinent part, “[a] court imposing a sentence of
incarceration for a crime of the first or second degree shall fix a minimum term of
85 percent of the sentence during which the defendant shall not be eligible for
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It should be evident from the foregoing discussion that the New
104
The statute allows
Jersey drug-induced death statute is flawed.
prosecutors to gain convictions against parties that the legislature
105
expressly excluded from application of 2C:35-9.
In fact, almost
ninety-percent of the time the statute is used, it is used against parties
other than drug dealers. Based on this reality, the unintended
consequences of the statute seem to outweigh any potential benefits
the statute may have, and therefore demand a reexamination of the
statute by the legislature. California Superior Court Judge James
Gray, a leader in drug law reform, summarized the problems
associated with the New Jersey statute best. Judge Gray stated, “laws
such as 2C:35-9 are cleaning out the little people from this whole
distribution mess, the ones who aren’t particularly smart, aren’t
particularly violent, and aren’t particularly organized, leaving it for
106
everyone else.”
III. ALTERNATIVES TO 2C:35-9 AND THE CURRENT STATE OF
DRUG-INDUCED DEATH LIABILITY IN NEW JERSEY.
In order to alleviate many of the problems the New Jersey drug107
induced statute creates, the New Jersey Legislature should look to
similar legislation and case law currently used in other states. Most of
these alternatives accomplish the same objectives as the New Jersey
108
statute, while not creating nearly as many problems.
These
109
alternatives include removal of the statute in its entirety, creating
110
less harsh penalties for violation, restricting liability to inherently
dangerous activities which have an immediate and direct causal
111
relationship to the death, removal of the strict liability feature of
the statute, and expressly limiting prosecutions under 2C:35-9 to
112
those parties who meet the statutory definition of a drug kingpin.

parole if the crime is a violent crime.” Id.
104
See discussion infra Part II.
105
See supra text accompanying notes 25-31.
106
Judge Gray also noted that users may be hesitant to seek help when another
overdoses, out of fear of being prosecuted. He stated, “are we having our children
overdosing on drugs when their contemporaries are fearful to get medical treatment
for them because they are afraid of the legal consequences?” Edwards, supra note 24,
at 1.
107
See infra Part II for a discussion of the various problems created by § 2C:35-9.
108
See infra Part III.
109
See infra Part III.A.
110
See infra Part III.B.
111
See infra Part III.C.
112
See infra Part III.D and Part III.E.
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A. Remove the Statute in its Entirety and Prosecute Drug-Induced
Death as Manslaughter.
The first alternative to 2C:35-9 is removal of the drug-induced
113
death statute in its entirety.
Removal of the statute would allow
prosecutors to achieve the same results that 2C:35-9 was intended to
114
produce, while at the same time ensuring removal of most of the
115
aforementioned problems associated with the law. This alternative
would prevent prosecutors from using the statute against unintended
116
parties, as was the case in Maldonado, State in the Interest of A.J., and
117
virtually all prosecutions under 2C:35-9. Furthermore, based on the
fact that the statute is rarely used to prosecute drug dealers or drug
118
and has a very limited deterrent effect on future
kingpins
119
conduct, the public would certainly be no worse off in the absence
of the statute.
Removal of the statute would also not have a significant impact
on the prosecutions of drug dealers in the state. There are a number
of state statutes, also enacted as part of the Comprehensive Drug
120
Reform Act of 1987, which ensure that drug dealers in New Jersey
121
receive harsh punishment for their crimes. Furthermore, even in
113

A number of state criminal codes do not contain a statute similar to § 2C:35-9
and instead prosecute drug-induced death as manslaughter. See infra notes 129-30.
114
A conviction under § 2C:35-9 is a first degree felony punishable by ten to
twenty years in prison. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(1) (West 2004). A conviction
of manslaughter is a second degree felony punishable by ten to thirty years in prison.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4 (West 2004).
115
See supra Part II for a discussion of the various problems the current druginduced legislation creates.
116
The legislative history of the statute indicates that the statute was to be used
only to target drug kingpins or upper echelon members of the organized drug
trade. See supra note 16. However, in Maldonado and State ex rel A.J. the statute was
used to convict a minor and a drug addict, neither of whom dealt drugs in any
serious manner.
117
See supra text accompanying notes 25-31.
118
See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
119
See supra text accompanying notes 88-93.
120
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004).
121
For example, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-3 (West 2004) imposes life
imprisonment for a party convicted of being the leader of a narcotics trafficking
network; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-4 (West 2004) makes it a first degree crime to
operate or maintain a controlled dangerous substance production facility; and N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-6 (West 2004) makes it a second degree crime to employ a
juvenile in a drug distribution network. See Miller, supra note 21, at § 25.20.
Furthermore, there is no merger for conviction under 2C:35-9 and distributing
controlled dangerous substances near school property. State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J.
536, 583, 645 A.2d 1165, 1188 (1994). There is no merger for conviction under §
2C:35-9 and convictions for being the leader of a narcotics trafficking network, or
maintaining or operating a controlled dangerous substances facility. N.J. STAT.
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122

those situations 2C:35-9 currently covers, removal of the statute
would have a limited impact on prosecutions of actual drug dealers,
as New Jersey case law indicates that the same set of facts that give rise
123
to 2C:35-9 liability may also give rise to liability for manslaughter,
124
which carries with it a presumptive sentence of ten to thirty years.
125
In State v. Thomas, the New Jersey Court of Appeals for
Middlesex County found that the sale of heroin to a party who
subsequently dies as a result of ingestion is sufficient to establish a
126
prima facie case of manslaughter.
In Thomas, the defendant sold
three packets of heroin to the decedent, who subsequently overdosed
127
and died as a result of injecting the narcotic. The court found that
the act of delivering narcotics to a party who dies as a result of
ingestion may meet the statutory definition of recklessness and
128
therefore give rise to manslaughter liability.
A number of other
129
states also subscribe to this view, including both Connecticut and
ANN. § 2:35-9(d) (West 2004). Finally, there is a merger for conviction under §
2C:35-9 and convictions for manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing illegal
narcotics when they arise out of the same transaction. Miller, supra note 21, at §
25.20.
122
The drug-induced death statute applies in situations where the defendant
distributed illegal narcotics to a party who dies as a result of ingestion of the drugs.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2004).
123
See State v. Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. 377, 288 A.2d 32 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1972).
124
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4 (West 2004).
125
See State v. Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. 377, 288 A.2d 32 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1972).
126
Id. at 379; see also State v. Ervin, 242 N.J. Super. 584, 577 A.2d 1273 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), where the court noted that a defendant who sold heroin
to a drug user who died from an overdose could be convicted of manslaughter. The
court justified its position, stating
“[the court is] satisfied that there can be imputed to defendant either
knowledge or reckless disregard of the consequence of his act, and that
the jury could have reasonably found from the proofs that beyond a
reasonable doubt the regular, natural and likely consequence of the
sale of heroin was the user’s death.
Id. at 590, 577 A.2d at 1276.
127
Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. at 378, 288 A.2d at 34.
128
Id. at 380, 288 A.2d at 35.
129
See State v. Wassil, 233 Conn. 174 (1995) (holding that because the state
manslaughter statute applies to all reckless conduct, there is no reason why the sale of
drugs for economic gain that results in death should be summarily exempt from
possible prosecution as manslaughter). But see State v. Dixon, 109 Ariz. 441 (1973)
(finding that the act of selling heroin to a party who dies upon injection does not
constitute second degree murder); People v. Pickney, 317 N.Y.S. 2d 416 (Cty. Ct.
1971) (holding that a drug dealer is not guilty of homicide if the party who received
the drugs dies as a result of ingestion); United States v Dillon, 18 M.J. 340, 16 Fed. R.
Evid. Serv. 532 (1984) (holding that conviction for involuntary manslaughter could
not be sustained based solely on the fact that the defendant sold the substance
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130

Kentucky. Therefore, pursuant to Thomas, it would still be possible
for a prosecutor to secure a homicide conviction against a drug
131
dealer even in the absence of 2C:35-9.
In fact, manslaughter
convictions carry with them a harsher presumptive sentence than
132
drug-induced death convictions.
Based on the aforementioned considerations, it seems that a
viable alternative to the current state of New Jersey drug-induced
death liability is the wholesale abandonment of 2C:35-9. In the
absence of 2C:35-9, prosecutors would have to proceed under case
133
law, specifically State v. Thomas, in order to secure a manslaughter
conviction for drug-induced death. While this alternative would
134
increase the prosecutor’s burden of persuasion at trial, such
increased burden would be minimal in comparison with the decrease
135
in the number of unintended drug-induced death prosecutions.
B. CREATE LESS HARSH PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION OF
2C:35-9.
The penalty for violation of New Jersey’s drug-induced death
136
statute is harsh in comparison to the majority of other states.
Currently, conviction under 2C:35-9 constitutes a first degree

(cocaine) to the decedent which caused his death).
130
See Lofthouse v. Commonwealth, 13 S.W.2d 236 (Ky. 2000) (finding that the
determination as to whether furnishing controlled dangerous substances to a party
who dies as a result of ingestion constitutes manslaughter should be made on a case
by case basis, after examining all relevant facts).
131
See supra note 127-28 and accompanying text. Prosecutors would just have to
proceed under case law, specifically State v. Thomas, where the Court found that the
same set of facts that currently give rise to liability under § 2C:35-9 may also give rise
to manslaughter liability; see also State v. Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. 377, 288 A.2d 32
(N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
132
A conviction under 2C:35-9 is a first degree felony punishable by ten to twenty
years in prison. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(1) (West 2004). A manslaughter
conviction is a second degree felony punishable by ten to thirty years in prison. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4 (West 2004).
133
Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. at 377, 288 A.2d at 32.
134
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4. In the absence of § 2C:35-9 prosecutors would
have to prove the defendant had the requisite mental state in order to gain a
conviction. See supra note 19 for a discussion of the implications of the strict liability
feature of the statute. With regard to manslaughter, the prosecutor must prove that
the defendant was acting recklessly. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4. In State v. Thomas,
the court defined recklessness as knowledge of or disregard for the consequences of
one’s actions. Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. at 377, 288 A.2d at 32.
135
See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
136
For a discussion on the severity of the New Jersey statute in comparison with
similar legislation in other states, see generally Talty, supra note 88, at 513. But see FLA.
STAT. ANN. 782.04 (West 2004), which makes drug-induced death a capital crime.
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felony, punishable by ten-to-twenty years in prison. Based on the
fact that in most instances the statute is used to prosecute unintended
139
parties, not “upper echelon” drug dealers, lessening the penalty for
violation will serve to create a more just result in the majority of
140
2C:35-9 prosecutions. While this alternative will not solve the major
problems associated with the statute, specifically, its strict application
141
against unintended parties, it will lessen the inequity experienced
142
as a result of these unintended prosecutions. Based on the various
other statutes often available to prosecutors under the same set of
143
facts which give rise to 2C:35-9 liability, and because of the
144
infrequency of prosecutions against actual drug kingpins, lessening
the penalty for violation will have a minimal impact even on those
prosecutions against actual drug dealers. Furthermore, even if
lessening the penalty for violation will result in a detriment to
prosecutions of actual drug dealers, as they will face shorter sentences
upon conviction, such detriment will be substantially outweighed by
the benefit given to the unintended parties most often prosecuted
145
under this statute.
Finally, lessening the penalty for conviction of drug-induced
146
death would place New Jersey in accord with the majority of states.
147
148
For example, Nevada and Louisiana punish drug-induced death
137

While drug use and drug crimes certainly pose serious problems for the state
of New Jersey, first-degree punishment is generally reserved for “the most severe and
intolerable criminal acts.” Talty, supra note 88, at 513 n.89.
138
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(1) (West 2004).
139
See supra Part II.
140
If the legislature and the courts continue to allow prosecutions under § 2C:359 that are clearly outside the intended scope of the statute, then reducing the penalty
for violation is the only way to lessen the unfairness experienced by unintended
parties most often prosecuted under the statute. See generally Edwards, supra note 24,
at 14.
141
See supra Part II for a discussion on the various problems created by § 2C:35-9.
142
See generally Edwards, supra note 24, at 14.
143
See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
144
Almost ninety percent of prosecutions under § 2C:35-9 are against parties with
no record of drug dealing. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
145
See supra note 143; see also notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
146
For a discussion on the severity of the New Jersey statute in comparison to
similar legislation in other states, see generally Talty, supra note 88, at 513.
147
The Nevada statute states, “If the death of a person is proximately caused by a
controlled substance which was made available to him by another person in violation
of this chapter, the person who made the substance available to him is guilty of
murder. If convicted of murder in the second degree, he is guilty of a category A
felony.” NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.333 (Michie 2004).
148
The Louisiana statute states that second degree murder is committed “when
the offender unlawfully distributes or dispenses a controlled dangerous substance
which is the direct cause of the death of the recipient who ingested or consumed the
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150

as a second degree felony, both Pennsylvania and Minnesota
punish it as a third degree felony, and Washington imposes a
151
statutory maximum of ten years upon conviction. Therefore, while
reducing the penalty for conviction of drug-induced death will not
solve all of the problems currently created by the New Jersey
legislation, it will serve to lessen the unfairness suffered by those
unintended parties most often prosecuted under the statute.
C. RESTRICT CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR DRUG-INDUCED
DEATH TO SITUATIONS WHERE THERE IS A STRONG
CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ACT OF
DISPENSING THE DRUGS AND THE DEATH.

A third alternative to the current New Jersey drug-induced death
statute is to restrict prosecutions under the statute to those felonies
that are inherently dangerous to human life, and only where there is
a demonstrated causal relationship between the distribution of the
152
153
drugs and the death. Nevada subscribes to this view.
154
In Sheriff, Clark County v. Morris, the Supreme Court of Nevada
considered the validity of applying the second degree murder
doctrine to a defendant who sold drugs to a party who overdosed and
155
died upon ingestion. In Morris, the Court found that drug-induced
death was punishable as second degree murder only in limited
156
situations.
Specifically, the court stated that drug-induced death
constituted second degree murder only in those situations where the
evidence indicates that the unlawful sale of drugs was inherently

controlled dangerous substance.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (West 2004).
149
The Pennsylvania statute states, “a person commits murder of the third degree
who administers, dispenses, delivers, gives, prescribes, sells, or distributes any
controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance . . . and another person dies
as a result of using the substance.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506 (West 2004).
In Commonwealth. v. Highhawk, 455 Pa. Super. 186 (1996), the court found that drug
delivery resulting in death was not merely a sentencing provision, but a separate
offense. Id. at 190.
150
The Minnesota statute states, “Whoever, without intent to cause death,
proximately causes the death of a human being by, directly or indirectly, distributing
a controlled substance is guilty of murder in the third degree and may be sentenced
to imprisonment for not more than 25 years.” MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.195 (West
2004).
151
In Washington, drug delivery resulting in death is a class B felony, punishable
by up to ten years in prison. WASH. REV. § CODE. § 69.50.415 (West 2004).
152
See Sheriff, Clark County v. Morris, 659 P.2d 852 (Nev. 1983).
153
Id.
154
659 P.2d 852 (Nev. 1983).
155
Id.
156
Id. at 859.
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157

dangerous to human life in the abstract, where there was an
158
immediate and causal relationship between the felonious conduct
159
and the death, and where the causal relationship extended beyond
the mere selling of the drugs to an actual involvement in the
160
ingestion of a lethal dosage by the decedent.
Therefore, in Nevada, in order to be convicted of second degree
drug-induced death, the prosecutor must prove that selling the drugs
to the decedent was inherently dangerous to human life in the
abstract, that there was no intervention by a third party or source
which contributed to the death, and only where the defendant was
actually involved in the consumption of the lethal drugs by the
161
decedent. Furthermore, the court noted that being in the presence
of the decedent when they ingest the drugs will not, in and of itself,
162
satisfy this requirement.
Abandonment of 2C:35-9 in favor of the approach taken to druginduced death prosecutions in Nevada would certainly remove many
163
of the problems created by the current legislation.
By requiring
that the defendant actually aid the decedent in his ingestion of the
lethal dose of drugs, the Nevada approach ensures that prosecutions
for drug-induced death are limited to those situations where the
defendant did more than just procure the drugs for the decedent, as
conviction requires that the defendant be an active participant or
164
contributor to the demise of the decedent.
Critics would argue that adoption of this approach in New Jersey
would defeat the whole purpose of the statute, which was to trace
liability for drug-induced deaths up the ladder to kingpins, regardless
157

Id. When making the determination as to whether a felony is inherently
dangerous to human life in the abstract, the court will not look at the specific victim,
the court will look at the least dangerous way to commit the felony and ask whether it
is inherently dangerous to human life. Id. Furthermore, the court refused to find
that unlawful distribution of drugs constitutes a felony inherently dangerous to
human life in all situations, instead leaving that determination up to the legislature.
Id; see also People v. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d 615 (1989) (noting that before applying the
felony murder doctrine the court must determine if the predicate felony is
inherently dangerous to human life in the abstract). Id. at 616.
158
The court defined immediate as, “without intervention from another source or
agency.” Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. The court stated, “absent more, the rule would not apply to a situation
involving a sale ingested in the defendant’s presence.” Id.
163
See supra Part II for a discussion of the various problems the New Jersey statute
creates.
164
See supra text accompanying note 160.
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of whether or not they were directly involved in the drug
165
transaction. However, based on the fact that 2C:35-9 is rarely used
166
in its intended capacity-against drug kingpins- adoption of the
Nevada approach would do no more than ensure that prosecutions
for drug-induced death in New Jersey are limited to those situations
where the defendant actually aided the decedent in his ingestion of
167
Under this approach, the all too often
the lethal dose of drugs.
repeated fact pattern, a group of friends buy drugs, share them, one
of the parties overdoses and dies and the others are charged with
168
drug-induced death, would not lead to an unjust conviction under
169
170
2C:35-9, as it currently does.
Therefore, while adoption of this
approach would serve to completely obliterate the ability of
171
prosecutors to convict drug kingpins under 2C:35-9, based on the
fact that prosecutors rarely attempt to convict drug kingpins under
172
the statute, abandoning it in favor of the Nevada approach would
ensure that future prosecutions for drug-induced death in New Jersey
165

Because Nevada requires that the defendant be an active participant in
administering the lethal dose, it is virtually impossible to gain a conviction against a
drug kingpin, who likely has no interaction with his buyers. See supra note 19. Upon
enacting the drug-induced death statute, the New Jersey legislature declared it the
public policy of the state that
in particular our criminal laws must target for expedited prosecution
and enhanced punishment those repeat drug offenders and upper
echelon members of organized narcotics trafficking networks who pose
the greatest danger to society. In order to ensure the most efficient and
effective dedication of limited investigative, prosecutorial, judicial and
correctional resources, it is the policy of this State to distinguish
between drug offenders based on the seriousness of the offense,
considering principally the nature, quality and purity of the controlled
substance and the role of the actor in the overall drug distribution
network. It is the intention of the legislature to provide for the strict
punishment, deterrence and incapacitation of the most culpable and dangerous
drug offenders, and to facilitate the rehabilitation of drug dependent persons.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004) (emphasis added).
166
See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
167
In Morris, in order to be convicted of drug-induced death, the court required
that the defendant be involved in the ingestion, through omission or commission, of
the lethal dose of the drugs. 659 P.2d 852, 859 (Nev. 1983).
168
Edwards, supra note 24, at 14. This was the fact scenario in Maldonado, State in
the Interest of A.J. and most other cases prosecuted under 2C:35-9. See infra Part II.
169
See supra note 162 and accompanying text. Of course, if one of the parties was
to aid the decedent in administering the lethal dose then that party would be liable
for drug-induced death, even in Nevada. Id.
170
See Maldonado, 137 N.J. at 536, 645 A.2d at 1165; Ervin, 242 N.J.Super. at 584,
577 A.2d at 1273; Cullum, 338 N.J. Super. at 458, 769 A.2d. at 1091; State ex rel A.J.,
232 N.J. Super. at 274, 556 A.2d at 1283.
171
See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
172
See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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173

are reserved to those parties who contributed to the death, not
merely observers and addicts who are currently favorite targets of
174
prosecutors.
D. INCLUDE A MENS REA REQUIRMENT IN 2C:35-9
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the strict liability
175
feature of 2C:35-9 creates a number of problems.
Specifically,
because the prosecutor can gain a conviction without establishing any
176
mental state, the burden of persuasion is significantly reduced. The
prosecutor need only prove that the defendant gave drugs to the
177
This feature was
decedent in order to carry his trial burden.
included in the New Jersey statute as a way to trace liability for druginduced death back to the upper echelon drug dealers, despite their
178
lack of knowledge of the transaction.
The Legislature envisioned
this statute as a powerful weapon against the growing number of drug
179
gangs in New Jersey,
but in actuality, the far majority of
prosecutions have been against every party except the drug dealer
180
involved in the transaction. These unintended prosecutions would
be very difficult, if not impossible, to attain if the prosecutor had to
181
prove mens rea.
i.

Recklessness

Requiring the prosecutor to prove reckless conduct
173

182

on the

See supra note 167.
See Maldonado, 137 N.J. at 536, 645 A.2d at 1165; Ervin, 242 N.J.Super. at 584,
577 A.2d at 1273; Cullum, 338 N.J. Super. at 458, 769 A.2d. at 1091; State ex rel A.J.,
232 N.J. Super. at 274, 556 A.2d at 1283; see also Edwards, supra note 24, at 14.
175
See infra Part II for a discussion of the various problems created by § 2C:35-9.
176
See supra note 19.
177
The strict liability feature of the New Jersey statute allows the prosecutor to
carry the burden of persuasion and gain a conviction without proving mens rea. See
supra notes 19-21 for a more detailed discussion.
178
See supra note 21; see also Edwards, supra note 24, at 14. (stating, “the purpose
of [§ 2C:35-9] was to hold dealers responsible for the danger they create by
punishing them as killers without regard to intent”).
179
Id.; see also NBC News.com, Gangs Take Root in the Garden State (November 7,
2002) (noting that the increase of violent crimes in New Jersey is directly correlated
with the “super-gangs” that have followed the drug trade east), available at
http://www.wnbc.com/news/1771216/detail.html.
180
Edwards, supra note 24, at 14 (noting that the majority of prosecutions for
drug-induced death are against friends of the decedent, other drug addicts, and
parties who sought assistance for the decedent).
181
Miller, supra note 21, at § 25.20. Under non-strict liability statutes the
prosecutor must establish that the defendant acted with the requisite mental state in
order to meet his burden of persuasion. Id.
182
Inclusion of a recklessness requirement in 2C:35-9 would be virtually identical
174
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part of the defendant in order to gain a conviction under 2C:35-9
would significantly reduce the number of unintended drug-induced
183
death prosecutions.
If this approach was taken in New Jersey, the
prosecutor would have to show, in order to meet his burden at trial,
that the defendant had facts within his knowledge that created a
substantial risk that his conduct would result in the death of another
184
This approach would make it virtually impossible to attack
party.
185
drug kingpins for drug-induced death,
instead reserving
prosecution for only the most culpable parties, those who knew of the
186
danger but proceeded anyway.
ii.

Knowledge

The inclusion of a knowledge requirement under 2C:35-9 would
also ensure that only the most culpable parties, those with actual
knowledge of the dangerousness of their actions, would be convicted
187
of drug-induced death.
Although inclusion of a knowledge
requirement would prevent many of the problems created by the
current statute, as 2C:35-9 would only apply to the most responsible
188
parties, the adoption of a knowledge requirement would be an
extreme action for the New Jersey Legislature, as the prosecutor
would carry a very difficult burden for all convictions under 2C:35189
9.

to removing the statute in its entirety and proceeding under manslaughter. See infra
Part III.A. However, there is limited authority for prosecutors to rely on with regard
to prosecuting drug-induced death as manslaughter. See State v. Thomas, 118 N.J.
Super. 377, 288 A.2d 32 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1972). Therefore inclusion of a
recklessness requirement by the legislature would create binding authority which
would allow prosecutors to proceed under a recklessness standard.
183
See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
184
In Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. at 377, 288 A.2d at 32, the court defined
recklessness as knowledge of or disregard for the consequences of one’s actions. Id.
at 380, 288 A.2d at 34.
185
Under non-strict liability statutes the prosecutor must establish that the
defendant acted with the requisite mental state in order to meet his burden of
persuasion. See supra note 19. Based on the fact that drug kingpins likely have little,
if any, interaction with their buyers, it would be nearly impossible for the prosecutor
to establish recklessness, knowledge, or negligence. See supra notes 19-21.
186
For an example of a state that has a recklessness requirement, see
Commonwealth. v. Catalina, 407 Mass. 779 (1990); Commonwealth. v. Auditor, 407
Mass. 793 (1990).
187
The Model Penal Code states that a person acts knowingly if he is aware, with
practical certainty, that his conduct will cause a certain result. MODEL PENAL
CODE
§ 2.02.
188
Id.
189
In order to secure a conviction the prosecutor must prove that the defendant
was practically certain that his conduct would cause a particular result. Id.
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E. Expressly Restrict Prosecutions Under 2C:35-9 to Drug Kingpins or
Leaders of Narcotic Trafficking Networks.
The final alternative to the current statute would be for the New
Jersey Legislature to expressly limit application of 2C:35-9 to drug
kingpins. The New Jersey Legislature stated in 2C:35-9’s legislative
history that use of the drug-induced death statute should be reserved
only for prosecution of the most culpable drug dealers, “those that
190
pose the greatest danger to society.”
However, the legislature did
not specifically limit application of the statute to such parties in the
191
statutory language, instead declaring such intention only in the
192
Critics will argue that the omission was
legislative history.
intentional, that the legislature never intended the statute to apply
193
only to “upper echelon” drug dealers or kingpins.
While this
argument may be valid, it is hard to imagine why the legislature
would have included a detailed legislative statement pronouncing it
194
the policy of the state to rehabilitate drug dependant persons, not
195
incarcerate them,
and then enact a statute that not only
incarcerates them, but also makes them ineligible for drug
196
rehabilitation programs upon conviction. However, even assuming
that the omission was intentional, based on the current state of
prosecutions under 2C:35-9 and the fact that drug dependant
197
persons, whom the legislature expressly sought to protect, are by far
198
the most frequently prosecuted parties under 2C:35-9, the statute
certainly needs to be reconsidered.
Expressly limiting application of the statute to the most
dangerous drug dealers, as is done in a number of other New Jersey
199
state statutes, would be the most effective solution to the plethora
200
of problems created by the current statute. The legislature could
expressly limit prosecutions to drug kingpins, defined as “individuals
who conspire with at least two other persons in a scheme or course of
190

See supra note 16.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2004).
192
See supra note 28.
193
Edwards, supra note 24, at 14.
194
See supra note 16.
195
Id.
196
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-14 (West 2004).
197
See supra note 16.
198
See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
199
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-3 (stating, “a person is a leader of a narcotics
trafficking network if he conspires with two or more other persons in a scheme or
course of conduct to unlawfully manufacture, distribute, dispense, bring into or
transport in this State [illegal narcotics]”).
200
See supra Part II for a discussion on the various problems created by the statute.
191
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conduct to unlawfully manufacture, distribute, dispense, bring into or
201
transport in this State illegal narcotics.” This alternative would give
prosecutors the power to protect citizens, by allowing them to
prosecute drug kingpins. At the same time, it would limit the power
of prosecutors to unfairly prosecute low-level dealers and drug
dependant persons, parties who, according to the legislature, should
202
be rehabilitated, not punished.
IV CONCLUSION
The majority of prosecutions for drug-induced death in New
Jersey are in direct contravention of legislative intent and therefore
203
result in inequitable and unfair consequences.
2C:35-9 was
envisioned by the New Jersey legislature as a way to attack the drug
trade in New Jersey, a way for prosecutors to hold drug kingpins
204
responsible for deaths that result from their indirect actions.
In
theory, the aforementioned justification is both an attainable goal
205
and one that is in the best interest of New Jersey citizens. However,
in actuality, due to inconsistent, infrequent and contradictory
206
application, 2C:35-9 achieves none of its objectives.
The most viable alternative to the current statute would be for
the legislature to expressly restrict prosecution under 2C:35-9 to
207
upper echelon drug dealers or kingpins, defined in the New Jersey
criminal code as “individuals who conspire with at least two or more
other persons in a scheme or course of conduct to unlawfully
manufacture, distribute, dispense, bring into or transport illegal
208
narcotics.”
This alternative would give prosecutors the power to
attack upper level drug dealers, in accordance with the original
intent of the statute. At the same time, this alternative would
significantly reduce the number of unintended prosecutions under
201

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-3 (West 2004).
See supra note 28.
203
See supra Part II.
204
See supra note 16; see also Edwards, supra note 24, at 1-14; Blair Talty, New
Jersey’s Strict Liability for Drug-induced Deaths: The Leap From Drug Dealer to Murderer, 30
RUTGERS L.J. 513 (1999).
205
The incapacitation of drug dealers is in the best interests of society because the
offender is incapable, for the time he is incarcerated, from offending again.
RICHARD G. SINGER & MARTIN GARDNER, CRIMES and PUNISHMENT: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW 298 (2d ed. 1996).
206
See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text; see also Edwards, supra note 24,
at 14 (noting that eight prosecutors interviewed acknowledge that § 2C:35-9 is not as
useful against dealers as the public had hoped).
207
See supra Part III.E.
208
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-3 (West 2004).
202
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the statute, as low level drug dealers and users would not meet the
209
statutory definition of drug kingpin.
Present application of 2C:35-9 has no significant impact on the
New Jersey drug trade, has no deterrent effect on future criminal
210
conduct, and more often than not is used to prosecute unintended
211
parties, most notably drug addicts, whom the legislature expressly
212
sought to protect from the statute.
Based on these realities, it
seems that the unintended and negative consequences of the statute
outweigh the positive ones. As such, the statute needs to be
reconsidered by the New Jersey legislature.

209
210
211
212

Id.; see also text accompanying notes 204-05.
See supra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
See supra note 16.

